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“I CAN DO IT MYSELF”—AN ANALYSIS OF WHETHER 
COMPETENCY TO REPRESENT ONESELF AT TRIAL IS A 
“RESTORABLE RIGHT” WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INDIANA V. EDWARDS 
Emily L. Barth* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For almost fifty years following the Supreme Court decision in Dusky 
v. United States, the legal definition of competency has remained the 
same.1  However, in the 2008 decision Indiana v. Edwards, the Supreme 
Court indicated that a distinct standard of competency is required for 
defendants who wish to proceed as pro se litigants.  The Edwards Court 
declined to specifically define what the distinct standard was, or how it 
should be applied, but the Court altered the legal definition of 
competency by explicitly indicating that the competency standard for 
pro se litigants was different from the Dusky standard.2 
Within the criminal justice system, a defendant’s mental competency, 
such as competency to stand trial and competency to plead, can vary 
depending on the defendant’s present mental state.  For example, if a 
defendant is initially deemed incompetent, the defendant’s competency 
to proceed can be restored—and the government actively seeks to 
restore the defendant’s competency.  This Comment argues that 
competency to proceed pro se3 can and should be a restorable right, 
especially given that the right to self-representation is a recognized 
constitutional right grounded in the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.4 
This Comment’s argument is not an easy premise, or one that exists 
without tension within both the legal and scientific communities.  This is 
especially true because legal scholars, including Supreme Court justices, 
have called into question whether a right to self-representation in 
 *   Associate Member, 2009–2010, University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 2. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008). 
 3. “Self-representation” will be used interchangeably with “pro se” throughout this Comment.  
Pro se is defined as “For himself; in his own behalf; in person.  Appearing for oneself, as in the case of 
one who does not retain a lawyer and appears for himself in court.”  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
712, 1099 (8th ed. 2004). 
 4. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2383–2384. 
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criminal proceedings ever existed at common law.5  These scholars 
challenge the overall holding in Faretta v. California6—namely that a 
constitutional Sixth Amendment right to self-representation in criminal 
proceedings ever existed.  Along the same lines, other legal scholars 
have actively advocated to overrule Faretta.7  This Comment, however, 
argues that if a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to 
counsel and elects to proceed pro se (i.e. legally waives the right to 
counsel under the Zerbst provisions),8 then the defendant, regardless of 
mental disability or defect, should be allowed to proceed pro se. 
Part II of this Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Faretta v. California and illustrates how a right to self-representation in 
criminal proceedings is firmly grounded in the Sixth Amendment.  In 
Part III, this Comment discusses the legal meaning of “competence” and 
questions what it means to be “competent in a court of law.”  Part III 
structures this line of questioning within the framework of relevant 
Supreme Court “competency” case law—through discussion of Dusky v. 
United States, Drope v. Missouri, and the “mental competency standard” 
as well as through discussion of Godinez v. Moran and “competency to 
plead.”  Part III then discusses the Supreme Court’s recent holding in 
Indiana v. Edwards and applies the standards set forth in Dusky, Drope, 
and Godinez in order to understand why the Supreme Court progressed 
from a low threshold for measuring competency, to a distinct standard 
for determining competency to proceed pro se. 
Part IV of this Comment examines in detail the distinct standard for 
competency to proceed pro se in a criminal proceeding established by 
Edwards, and argues through analogy and other applicable Supreme 
Court case law that competency to proceed pro se, as a Sixth 
Amendment constitutional right, can and should be a restorable right.  
Part IV continues by offering possible safeguards that can be put in 
place to assure that defendants are permitted to act in a pro se capacity 
only if they have knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to 
counsel.  These safeguards include special roles for the court, the role of 
 5. See Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Indiana v. 
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) 
(Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting); Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 528 U.S. 152, 156, 158 
(2000). 
 6. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806. 
 7. See generally Reply Brief for Petitioner, Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-
208); Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 628 (2005); 
Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for Fairness and 
Against Self Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 165 
(2000). 
 8. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss3/5
I-BARTH 8/3/2011  11:00:34 AM 
2011] COMPETENCY TO SELF-REPRESENT 1141 
 
mental health professionals, and the appointment of standby counsel. 
As previously recognized, allowing a defendant to stand trial without 
the benefit of counsel, especially if the defendant’s personal state raises 
capacity concerns, is highly debated.  The Court has recognized in 
several contexts that “the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity 
and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in 
acting as his own lawyer.”9  However, more importantly, the Court has 
also recognized that “a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel must 
be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood 
of the law.’”10  This Comment argues that it is possible to strike a 
balance between these two competing interests, and as such, the 
constitutional right to self-representation should be a restorable right. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION 
A. Self-Representation Is a Constitutional Right 
The history behind the right of self-representation can be traced back 
to the Revolutionary Era.11  In criminal proceedings, the right to self-
representation is grounded in an interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment.12  In non-criminal contexts, the right to self-representation 
has also been traced to the Privileges and Immunities Clause,13 the First 
Amendment,14 the Due Process Clause,15 and the Equal Protection 
Clause.16  In support of the right of self-representation, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia succinctly stated, “[o]ne 
 9. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162. 
 10. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2384 (2008) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
350–51 (1970)). 
 11. See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO 
SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 22 (1998) [hereinafter 
MEETING THE CHALLENGE].  Arguing in support of the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 
Thomas Paine said, “either party . . . has a natural right to plead his own case; this right is consistent 
with safety, therefore, it is retained; but the parties may not be able . . . therefore the civil right of 
pleading by proxy, that is, by counsel, is an appendage to the natural right of self-representation.”  Id. 
(citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 830). 
 12. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806. 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.  See also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52, No. 3, 230 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230); Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See specifically the First Amendment right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.  Id.  See also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 
404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
& Brennan, J., concurring).  For a detailed discussion of the constitutional origins of the right to self-
representation, see MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 11, at 19–24. 
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of the basic principles, one of the glories, of the American system of 
justice is that the courthouse door is open to everyone—the humblest 
citizen, the indigent, the convicted felon, the illegal alien.”17 
The Sixth Amendment does not explicitly recognize a constitutional 
right to self–representation in criminal proceedings;18 however, in the 
leading self-representation case, Faretta v. California, the Supreme 
Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment encompasses a 
constitutional right to self-representation.19  Acknowledging that the 
right to self-representation is not explicitly stated within the text of the 
Sixth Amendment, the Faretta Court found that the right to self-
representation—and the right to make one’s own defense—is necessarily 
implied by the plain language structure of the Sixth Amendment.20  
Citing the specific verbiage of the Sixth Amendment, the Court found 
that the right to defend is given directly to the accused “for it is he who 
suffers the consequences if the defense fails.”21  Subpart II(B) analyzes 
the Faretta holding and the Supreme Court’s rationale behind 
recognizing a constitutional right to self-representation. 
B. Faretta v. California—Recognizing a Constitutional Right of Self–
Representation 
In Faretta, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a 
state may force counsel upon defendants who insist upon conducting 
their own defense.22  Recognizing the complexity of this question, the 
Faretta Court built upon several preceding cases and recognized a 
constitutional right to self-representation in a narrow and highly 
contested 5–4 decision.23 
In analyzing the issue, the Faretta Court found a “nearly universal 
conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a 
lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to 
 17. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 205–06 
(D.D.C. 1985). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 19. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).  Subpart II(C) discusses the basis for and 
implications of the Faretta holding. 
 20. Id. at 819. 
 21. Id. at 819–20.  The Court continued with the affirmation that “an unwanted counsel 
represents the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction.  Unless the accused has 
acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the 
Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.”  Id. at 821. 
 22. Id. at 806, 807. 
 23. See generally id. 
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defend himself if he truly wants to do so.”24  Finding support for self-
representation in prior case law, the structure of the Sixth Amendment, 
English jurisprudence, and colonial jurisprudence,25 the Court 
recognized a constitutional right to self-representation if the defendant 
voluntarily and intelligently elects to proceed without counsel.26  The 
Court grounded its decision by recognizing that “[t]he right to defend is 
personal.  The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the 
personal consequences of a conviction.”27 
Although the majority affirmatively recognized a constitutional right 
to self-representation, the 5–4 decision spawned two lengthy dissents.28  
The dissenters espoused their disagreement with the majority stating that 
“there is nothing desirable or useful in permitting every accused person, 
even the most uneducated and inexperienced, to insist upon conducting 
his own defense to criminal charges.”29  The dissenters also found the 
majority’s claim that self-representation is a constitutional right was 
unfounded.30  Perhaps prophetically, in his dissent, Justice Blackmun 
posed a series of questions regarding the procedural aspects of a right of 
self-representation.31  Justice Blackmun asserted that “[t]he procedural 
problems spawned by an absolute right to self-representation will far 
outweigh whatever tactical advantage the defendant may feel he has 
gained by electing to represent himself.”32  Part IV of this Comment will 
address some of the procedural problems posed by Justice Blackmun in 
Faretta and will offer counterarguments to his dissent.  Additionally, it 
will offer safeguards that can be put in place to assure that self-
representation, while not an absolute right, can be a restorable right in 
many instances. 
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE LEGALLY COMPETENT? 
To maintain the validity and integrity of the criminal justice system, a 
defendant must be competent at every stage of the criminal justice 
process.33  An accused person’s competency is an issue at various stages 
of a criminal proceeding, including for example: (1) competency to 
 24. Id. at 817. 
 25. Id. at 818. 
 26. Id. at 818–36. 
 27. Id. at 834. 
 28. Id. at 836–52 (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 836 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 843. 
 31. Id. at 846–52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 32. Id. at 852. 
 33. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/ LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 171 (2d ed. 2009). 
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stand trial; (2) competency to plead guilty; and (3) competency to 
proceed as a pro se litigant.  The issue of an accused person’s 
competency to stand trial—also known as trial fitness—has become one 
of the more controversial issues in criminal law.34  An estimated 60,000 
competency evaluations are carried out annually.35  Part III of this 
Comment addresses the Supreme Court’s definition of competency 
through a discussion of the Court’s mental competency standard, 
competency to plead standard, and competency to proceed as a pro se 
litigant standard. 
A. The Supreme Court Defines “Competency” 
The Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants may not be tried 
in court unless they are competent.36  The word competent derives from 
the Latin “competere,” meaning “be fit or proper.”37  “Competent” has 
three common definitions: (1) having the necessary skill or knowledge 
to do something successfully; (2) satisfactory or adequate, though not 
outstanding; and (3) having legal authority to deal with a particular 
matter.38  The Supreme Court, however, has never specifically defined 
how “competency” is to be assessed.  Rather, the Supreme Court 
established standards of competency through case law.  Three of these 
decisions are instrumental in understanding the Court’s holding in 
Indiana v. Edwards, as well as in determining whether competency to 
proceed pro se is a restorable right.  These decisions are discussed in 
turn below in subparts III(B–C).  The Indiana v. Edwards decision and 
the standard for competency to proceed pro se is discussed in subpart 
III(D). 
B. The Mental Competency Standard—Dusky and Drope 
The Supreme Court illustrated the Constitution’s “mental 
competence” standard39 in Dusky v. United States40 and Drope v. 
 34. Id. at 171. 
 35. See MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health & the Law, The McArthur Adjudicative 
Competence Study, available at http://macarthur.virginia.edu/adjudicate.html#N_1_ (last visited Nov. 
15, 2010). 
 36. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). 
 37. Oxford Dictionaries, Competent, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/ 
m_en_us1234931#m_en_us1234931 (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008). 
 40. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
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Missouri.41 
In Dusky, the Supreme Court found the previous standard for 
evaluating a defendant’s competency to stand trial insufficient, and 
therefore established a new two-prong standard.42  Under this new 
Dusky standard, a defendant is deemed competent to stand trial if the 
defendant: (1) “has sufficient present ability to consult with [her] lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,” and (2) “has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
her.”43 
The Dusky standard established a minimal constitutional standard 
regarding competency.  However, the Dusky standard is vague in how its 
two prongs are to be practically applied in court proceedings.  The 
Dusky standard is even vaguer in that it fails to spell out the exact 
meaning of “incompetent.”  Fifteen years later, the Court attempted to 
clarify the Dusky standard in its decision in Drope v. Missouri. 
In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Burger, the Drope 
Court held that it is a violation of due process to require a person to 
stand trial while incompetent.44  Building upon its earlier decision in 
Dusky, the Court again declined to provide a specific definition of 
incompetency.  The Drope Court affirmed the standard established in 
Dusky, and bolstered the Dusky standard by holding that even when a 
defendant is competent at the commencement of the trial, a trial court 
must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would 
render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand 
trial.45 
However, neither the Dusky nor the Drope Court considered the 
relation of the mental competence standard to the right of self-
representation.  This distinction played an important part in the Court’s 
analysis in deciding Indiana v. Edwards,46 which is discussed in Part IV 
of this Comment. 
C. Godinez v. Moran—Competency to Plead 
In Godinez v. Moran, the Supreme Court revisited the standard of 
competency for pleading guilty and the standard for waiving the right to 
 41. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). 
 42. Id. at 402–03. 
 43. Id. at 402 (emphasis added).  The Dusky standard is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (2006). 
 44. Drope, 420 U.S. at 162. 
 45. Id. at 181. 
 46. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2383 (2008). 
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counsel.47  The Godinez Court addressed the unanswered question 
regarding whether the Dusky competency standard for pleading guilty or 
waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for 
standing trial.48  The Supreme Court rejected the “reasoned choice” 
standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit,49 and held that competence to 
plead guilty and competence to waive the right to counsel is the exact 
same standard for competency to stand trial previously outlined in 
Dusky.50 
The Court premised its holding on two concepts: (1) defendants are 
required to make a variety of important decisions in the course of 
criminal proceedings, and (2) competency to waive counsel is different 
than the competency to proceed pro se.51  The Godinez Court recognized 
that defendants who stand trial are likely to be presented with a myriad 
of choices that require the relinquishment of the same rights as a 
defendant who pleads guilty.52  Noting that “while the decision to plead 
guilty is undeniably a profound one,” the Court ultimately determined 
that the decision to plead guilty “is no more complicated than the sum 
total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during 
the course of trial.”53  Additionally, the Godinez Court found that there 
was no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires a 
higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other 
constitutional rights.54  Also, while there is a “heightened” standard for 
pleading guilty and waiving the right to counsel, as the waiver must be 
knowing and voluntarily made, “it is not a heightened standard of 
competence.”55  The Godinez Court concluded that requiring 
 47. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
 48. Id. at 391. 
 49. Id. at 394 (holding that “the state court’s postconviction ruling was premised on the wrong 
legal standard of competency” (quoting Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992))).  The 
Ninth Circuit continued: 
“Competency to waive constitutional rights . . . requires a higher level of mental 
functioning than that required to stand trial”; while a defendant is competent to stand trial 
if he has “a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and is capable of 
assisting his counsel,” a defendant is competent to waive counsel or plead guilty only if 
he has “the capacity for ‘reasoned choice’ among the alternatives available to him.” 
Id. 
 50. Id. at 397–98. 
 51. Id. at 398–401. 
 52. Id. at 398.  The Court specifically mentioned the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to confront a defendant’s accusers, how to put on a defense, and whether to raise 
one or more affirmative defenses.  Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 399. 
 55. Id. at 400–01. 
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competency of criminal defendants has a “modest aim: It seeks to ensure 
that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist 
counsel[;] . . . the Due Process Clause does not impose . . . additional 
requirements.”56 
Although the Godinez Court determined that a heightened standard of 
competency was unnecessary for defendants entering guilty pleas, the 
Court adopted a distinct competency standard in Indiana v. Edwards. 
D. Indiana v. Edwards—Adopting a Distinct Definition of Competency 
for Pro Se Litigants 
Indiana v. Edwards involved a criminal defendant whom a state court 
found mentally competent to stand trial if represented by counsel, but 
not mentally competent to proceed as a pro se litigant.  The Supreme 
Court considered whether the Constitution forbids a state from insisting 
that the defendant proceed to trial with counsel, which implies that the 
state could deny the defendant the right to represent him or herself.57 
Ahmad Edwards tried to steal a pair of shoes from a department 
store.58  When a store security officer approached Edwards, Edwards 
drew a gun and fired, wounding a bystander.59  Edwards was 
subsequently apprehended and charged with attempted murder, battery 
with a deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft.60  Edwards 
suffered from schizophrenia.61  Edwards’s mental condition, and 
whether he was competent to proceed to trial, became the focus of three 
competency proceedings and two self-representation requests, spanning 
an almost six year period.62 
Almost a year after his indictment, the hospital determined that 
Edwards’s condition had improved to the point where he was competent 
to stand trial.63  The trial began almost a year after this determination.64  
Immediately before his trial commenced, Edwards requested to 
represent himself as a pro se litigant65 because his attorney had not spent 
adequate time preparing the case and because his attorney was not 
 56. Id. at 402. 
 57. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2381 (2008). 
 58. Id. at 2382. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 2382–83. 
 63. Id. at 2382.  This competency determination was made about eight months after Edwards’s 
recommitment.  Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
9
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sharing legal materials with him.66  Edwards also requested a 
continuance in order to prepare his pro se defense.67  In addition, 
Edwards filed a number of incoherent written pleadings, but he also filed 
several “intelligible” pleadings, such as a motion to dismiss counsel, a 
motion to dismiss charges under the state speedy trial provision, and a 
motion seeking a trial transcript.68  The trial judge concluded that 
Edwards had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and 
then questioned Edwards about matters of state law.69  Edwards 
correctly answered questions about voir dire, and described the basic 
framework for admitting videotape evidence at trial.70  However, 
Edwards was unable to answer questions regarding state evidentiary 
rules, which the judge only identified by the rule number while 
questioning Edwards.71  Edwards continued to request to proceed pro se, 
but because the court refused Edwards’s request for a continuance, 
Edwards subsequently proceeded to trial represented by appointed 
counsel.72  Edwards was convicted of criminal recklessness and theft, 
but the jury could not reach a verdict on the attempted murder and 
battery with a deadly weapon charges.73 
The State retried Edwards on the attempted murder and battery 
charges.  Edwards again petitioned the trial court to proceed pro se.74  
Edwards explained to the court that he wished to proceed pro se because 
he and his attorney disagreed about the proper defense for the attempted 
murder charge.75  Edwards wished to assert self-defense, while his 
attorney wanted to present a lack of intent defense.76  Edwards 
explained, “my objection is me and my attorney actually had discussed a 
defense, I think prosecution had mentioned that, and we are in 
disagreement with it.  He has a defense and I have a defense that I would 
like to represent or present to the Judge.”77  The court denied his 
request.78  Citing Edwards’s psychiatric reports, the court determined 
Edwards still suffered from schizophrenia and held “[w]ith these 
 66. Id. at 2389 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. 2382 (majority opinion). 
 68. Id. at 2389 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2389–90. 
 72. Id. at 2382 (majority opinion). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 2390 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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findings, he’s competent to stand trial but I’m not going to find he’s 
competent to defend himself.”79  Edwards was represented by appointed 
counsel and was convicted on both the attempted murder and battery 
charges.80 
Edwards appealed the trial court decisions, arguing that the trial 
court’s refusal to allow him to proceed as a pro se litigant deprived him 
of his constitutional right of self-representation.81  The state appellate 
court agreed and ordered a new trial.  The Indiana Supreme Court then 
held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents, namely Faretta and 
Godinez, required the court to allow Edwards to proceed as a pro se 
litigant.82 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court 
acknowledged that its precedents, namely the opinions in Faretta, 
Dusky, Drope, and especially Godinez, framed the issue presented, but 
did not directly answer the question posed by the Indiana Supreme 
Court.83  In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court answered 
the question regarding whether the Constitution permits a state to limit a 
defendant’s self-representation right by insisting upon representation by 
counsel at trial—“on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental 
capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented”84—assuming 
that (1) a criminal defendant has sufficient mental competence to stand 
trial (i.e., the defendant meets the Dusky standard), and that (2) the 
defendant insists on representing himself during the trial.85  The 
Edwards Court ultimately held that “the Constitution permits States to 
insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to 
stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to 
the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by 
themselves,” thus creating a distinct competency standard.86 
The Edwards Court premised its holding on three separate factors: (1) 
Supreme Court precedent in regard to mental competency, (2) the 
premise that mental illness is not a unitary concept, and (3) the necessity 
to “‘affirm the dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to 
conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.”87  Each of these 
three separate rationales is briefly discussed below. 
 79. Id. at 2382–83 (majority opinion). 
 80. Id. at 2383. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2382–85. 
 84. Id. at 2385–86. 
 85. Id. at 2385. 
 86. Id. at 2388. 
 87. Id. at 2386–87. 
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The first rationale in support of the Court’s holding is that, although 
the Court’s precedent does not directly answer the question presented, 
the Court’s precedent tends to support the Edwards decision.88  The 
Court reasoned that its prior mental competence standards developed in 
Dusky, Drope, and Godinez assume the necessity of representation by 
counsel and emphasize the importance of counsel.89  The Edwards Court 
further reasoned these prior decisions suggest, although do not hold, that 
“an instance in which a defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at 
trial presents a very different set of circumstances, [and therefore] calls 
for a different standard.”90 
The second rationale in support of the Edwards Court’s distinct 
standard is the Court’s belief that mental illness is not a “unitary 
concept,” i.e. assessing the competency of offenders with a mental 
illness is not a unitary concept.91  The Edwards Court acknowledged 
that in certain circumstances a defendant may be able to satisfy the 
Dusky mental competency standard, yet at the same time the defendant 
may be unable to carry out the basic tasks necessary to present a defense 
without the assistance of counsel.92  The Court reasoned that because 
mental illness is not a unitary concept and varies in degree, a single 
mental competency standard for deciding both (1) whether a defendant 
who is represented by counsel can proceed to trial and (2) whether a 
defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself, was 
unworkable.93 
The Edwards Court’s third rationale was that a right of self-
representation at trial will not “affirm the dignity” of a defendant who 
lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance 
of counsel.94  Finding support from its holding in McKaskle v. 
Wiggins,95 the Court reasoned that “dignity” and “autonomy” of the 
individual underlie the self-representation right.96  Drawing on its 
second rationale, the Court stated that given a defendant’s uncertain 
mental state, “the spectacle that could well result from his self-
representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as 
ennobling.”97  The Court further reasoned that insofar as a defendant’s 
 88. Id. at 2386. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 2387. 
 95. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984). 
 96. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387. 
 97. Id. at 2387. 
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lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-
representation “undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal 
law objectives, providing a fair trial.”98 
Ultimately, the Edwards Court determined that the Dusky basic 
mental competence standard, which was also applied in Godinez, was 
insufficient to address a defendant’s competency to proceed pro se.99 
IV. THE STANDARD ESTABLISHED IN INDIANA V. EDWARDS 
Although the Supreme Court held that a distinct standard of 
competency applies for determining a defendant’s competency to 
proceed pro se, the Edwards Court declined to provide clear guidelines 
regarding what the distinct standard is, or how the distinct standard 
should be applied.100  The American Bar Association, Standard 6–3.6, 
entitled “The Defendant’s Election to Represent Himself or Herself at 
Trial,” sets forth three factors that the trial judge should consider in 
determining whether a defendant should be allowed to proceed without 
the assistance of counsel: (1) the defendant has been clearly advised of 
the right to the assistance of counsel, including the right to the 
assignment of counsel when the defendant is so entitled; (2) the 
defendant is capable of understanding the proceedings; and (3) the 
defendant has made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to 
counsel.101 
Part IV of this Comment explores the distinct pro se competency 
standard established in Edwards, and argues that regardless of whether a 
distinct standard exists, competency to proceed pro se should and can be 
a restorable right. 
A. After Edwards, What Is the Standard for Competency to Represent 
Oneself? 
In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution supports a 
higher competency standard for proceeding pro se than for proceeding to 
trial with counsel—thus creating a distinct competency standard.  
However, the Edwards Court did not endorse Indiana’s proposed 
standard for self-representation competency, and, as previously 
mentioned, the Edwards Court did not set forth its own standard for self-
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2387–88. 
 100. See generally id. at 2379. 
 101. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE 
TRIAL JUDGE § 6-3.6 (3d ed. 2000). 
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representation competency.102 
1. The Supreme Court’s Floor and Ceiling 
In Edwards, the Supreme Court effectively offered a floor and a 
ceiling for creating a standard of self-representation competency.  The 
Edwards Court’s holding reflected the “floor” for a standard of self-
representation competency—the standard for self-representation 
competency is higher than the Dusky standard—as the Edwards Court 
held that “the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation 
by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but 
who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are 
not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”103 
By striking down Indiana’s proposed standard, the Edwards Court 
also created the “ceiling” for a standard of self-representation 
competency.  Indiana asked the Court to adopt a more specific standard 
that would “deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at 
trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court 
or a jury.”104  The Edwards Court declined to adopt Indiana’s 
“communicate coherently” standard for evaluating self-representation 
competency as the Edwards Court was uncertain how the standard 
would work in practice.105 
Therefore, although the Edwards Court declined to provide a specific 
standard for evaluating self-representation competency, the Edwards 
Court did provide a floor and a ceiling.  The Court’s standard for self-
representation competency is higher than the Dusky standard, but lower 
than (or different from) Indiana’s proposed “communicate coherently” 
standard. 
2. Can a Workable Standard Be Reached?—Subjective vs. Objective 
Application 
There seems to be a prevalent distaste for defendants, especially 
criminal defendants, who elect to proceed pro se.  This distaste is 
reflected in both Justice Blackmun’s Faretta dissent and in the old 
adage, “[o]ne who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.”106  
However, empirical data has shown that pro se defendants fair no worse 
 102. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2387–88. 
 103. Id. at 2388. 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975). 
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than defendants represented by counsel, and in some cases actually fair 
better.107  This data lends itself to support the notion that a workable 
restorable right model can be achieved for defendants with a mental 
illness that elect to proceed pro se—especially if the restorable right 
model is implemented on a case-by-case basis.  A subjective application 
of the restorable right model would also adhere to the Edwards Court’s 
observation that evaluating the competency of defendants with a mental 
illness is not a “unitary concept.”108  Additionally, a subjective case-by-
case review of defendants with mental illness who wish to proceed pro 
se would not overburden the court as the rate of self-represented litigants 
is roughly 0.3 to 0.5%.109 
B. Can Competency to Represent Oneself Be Restored? 
When a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial or incompetent 
to plea,110 the court actively tries to restore the defendant’s competency 
so that the pending criminal process can proceed.  However, under 
Edwards, when a defendant is found incompetent to proceed as a pro se 
litigant, instead of attempting to restore the defendant to an active state 
of competency, the court instead forces counsel upon the defendant—
ostracizing the defendant from conducting his or her own defense.  In 
the subpart below, this Comment argues that the holding in Sell v. 
United States111 should also apply in seeking to restore competency in 
defendants that desire to proceed pro se. 
1. Restoring a Defendant’s Competency to Proceed Pro Se Through 
Medication 
The liberty interest grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution extends defendants the right to refuse 
psychotropic medications.112  However, this liberty interest is not 
 107. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the 
Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 447–55 (2007).  For a concise breakdown of the data on 
felony pro se defendants in state and federal court, see Table 1 and Table 2, located within Ms. 
Hashimoto’s article.  Id. 
 108. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2386. 
 109. See Hashimoto, supra note 107, at 447.  These percentages reflect felony pro se defendants 
pulled from the Federal Court Database and the State Court Database at the time of the study.  Id. 
 110. Both of these competency standards are the same; the applicable standard is the Dusky 
standard. 
 111. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 112. Id.  See also Vinneth Carvalho, Involuntary Medication Administration Standards for 
Restoring Competency to Stand Trial, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW, Mar. 2006. 
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absolute.  In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court developed the 
four-factor “Sell Test.”113  Involuntary administration of drugs, solely 
for trial competency purposes, is permitted if the four specific criteria 
laid out in the Sell Test are met: (1) that “important governmental 
interests are at stake” in trying the defendant; (2) that involuntary 
medication will “significantly further” this interest; (3) that involuntary 
medication is “necessary” to further the government’s interests; and (4) 
that the administration of the medication is “medically appropriate,” or 
that it is in the defendant’s “best interest in light of his medical 
problems.”114 
In the case of defendants who desire to proceed pro se, but are found 
by the court to be incompetent to do so, then arguably the spirit of the 
Sell Test should also apply to those defendants.  Under the holding in 
Sell, defendants should be permitted to elect to take psychotropic 
medication in order to be restored to competency to proceed pro se, just 
as defendants are involuntarily forced to take medication in order to be 
restored to trial competency. 
For example, if a defendant in a criminal proceeding elected to 
proceed pro se, but under the Edwards standard was found incompetent 
to do so, instead of automatically having counsel forced upon her, the 
defendant could choose to take medication in an attempt to restore her 
competency to proceed pro se.  Applying the Sell Test with the 
defendant’s interests at the center of the analysis—instead of the 
government’s interests—a defendant may be permitted to take 
medication to restore her competency to proceed pro se if the four 
factors are met.  Therefore, the first Sell factor is met because the 
defendant’s liberty interest and interest in presenting her own defense 
meets the “important interests at stake” analysis.  The second factor, that 
medication will “significantly further” this interest, is most likely met 
upon a determination and medical evaluation by a psychiatrist or other 
mental health professional that the medication is appropriate for treating 
the defendant’s mental illness or defect, and will most likely restore the 
defendant to a state of competency if the medication is taken as 
prescribed.  The third factor, that medication is “necessary” to further 
the defendant’s interests, is met if, as a reflection of the second factor, 
the mental health professional finds as a result of the evaluation that the 
defendant cannot be restored to competency without the assistance of 
psychotropic medications in order to be restored to competency to 
proceed as a pro se litigant.  And finally, the fourth factor, the 
 113. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180–82. 
 114. Id.  See also Carvalho, supra note 112. 
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administration of the medication is “medically appropriate,” or that the 
medication is in the defendant’s “best interest in light of his medical 
problems,” is again a reflection of the result of the mental health 
professional’s evaluation of the defendant—if the defendant is found to 
have a treatable mental illness, such as schizophrenia or a delusional 
disorder, then medication is most likely medically appropriate to restore 
the defendant to a state of competency to proceed pro se.  If on the other 
hand, the defendant is found to suffer from serious mental retardation, 
which under any amount or type of medication is not treatable, then 
medication is not appropriate or in the best interests of the defendant 
because medication is unlikely to restore the defendant to a state of 
competency to proceed pro se.115 
2. How Much Time Should the Defendant Be Allotted to Be Restored to 
Competency to Proceed Pro Se—Drawing Analogies from Competency 
in Other Criminal Justice Proceedings 
In other legal realms of competency evaluations, there is typically a 
standard, statutorily imposed time limit in which the defendant must be 
restored to the required level of competency.  As an example, 
competency to stand trial (CST) imposes such a limit.116  If the 
defendant is not restored to CST within this time limit, then the 
defendant is usually civilly committed.117  Under a restorable right 
model, this Comment offers that a similar statutorily constructed time 
limit may be imposed for self-representation competency to be restored.  
If at the end of the statutorily imposed time limit the defendant remained 
incompetent to proceed pro se, the defendant would have counsel 
appointed to assist in her defense (assuming that the defendant is 
competent to stand trial). 
C. Procedural Safeguards and Determinations 
This subpart suggests various procedural safeguards and 
determinations from third party professionals that can be put in place to 
dissuade the notion that “[n]o trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a 
 115. However, medication may be appropriate for other purposes. 
 116. See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).  Jackson enforced a 
reasonableness limit: due process dictates that commitment for competence restoration treatment last no 
longer than “the reasonable period of time” needed to determine whether there exists a substantial 
probability of attaining competence in the foreseeable future.  Id. 
 117. Id.  Once a court finds that restoration is not substantially probable, the “[s]tate must either 
institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any 
other citizen, or release the defendant.”  Id. 
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man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental 
condition stands helpless and alone before the court,”118 and to work to 
ensure that competency to proceed pro se can be a restorable right of the 
defendant in many instances. 
1. Involvement of the Court 
The Edwards Court proffered that the trial judge “will often prove 
best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to 
the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.”119  
However, especially in the case of Edwards, in which the same trial 
judge presided over one of his competency hearings and his two  
trials,120 the risk of prejudice and bias on behalf of the trial judge in 
evaluating the competency of a defendant to proceed pro se is fairly 
substantial.  Although the trial judge may be intimately familiar with the 
facts of the case and the legal proceedings, the trial judge may not be the 
best person to objectively and fairly evaluate the defendant’s 
competency to proceed in a pro se capacity, especially because in most 
instances the trial judge will have little to no mental health or medical 
training. 
In order to reach a workable standard for evaluating self-
representation competency and for self-representation to be recognized 
as a restorable right, it is important to look to other legal competency 
evaluations for insight.  The subpart below discusses the role mental 
health professionals should play in creating a workable standard for self-
representation competency. 
2. Involvement of Mental Health Professionals 
Drawing analogies from other legal competency evaluations, such as 
CST evaluations and competency to plead evaluations, this Comment 
argues that mental health professionals should play a more involved role 
in creating a workable standard for competency to self-representation, 
and in evaluating self-representation as a restorable right.  Instead of the 
trial judge as the primary evaluator of the defendant’s competency, as 
suggested by the Edwards Court, a neutral third party mental health 
provider may be in a better position to objectively evaluate the 
defendant’s competency to proceed pro se as well as to make 
 118. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (quoting Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 
108 (1954)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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recommendations regarding whether the defendant has the potential to 
be restored to competency through medication or other means. 
The concept of a third party mental health professional evaluating the 
competency of defendants is not a new concept—it is the practice 
followed in CST and competency to plead evaluations.121  For example, 
if a defendant files a motion with the court to proceed pro se, but after 
questioning, the trial judge elects not to accept the defendant’s waiver of 
counsel, under a restorable right standard of self-representation 
competency, the trial judge would then refer the defendant to a third 
party mental health professional for a competency evaluation.  The 
mental health professional would evaluate the defendant and would offer 
recommendations to the court regarding whether the defendant was 
competent to proceed pro se.  If the mental health professional 
determined that the defendant was incompetent to proceed pro se, the 
defendant could choose to have counsel appointed.  Alternatively, under 
a restorable right model, the defendant could attempt to be restored to 
competency to proceed pro se by taking medication, and after a set 
period of time, undergo another evaluation by the mental health 
professional to determine if the defendant had been restored to 
competency to proceed pro se.  The mental health professionals would 
thus play a more pivotal role than the Edwards Court originally 
suggested.  This increased role would provide a more objective and fair 
medical evaluation of the defendant in determining competency to 
proceed pro se. 
3. Appointment of Standby Counsel 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]ne might not be insane in 
the sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to 
stand trial without benefit of counsel.”122  However, in McKaskle v. 
Wiggins,123 the Supreme Court reached a workable compromise with the 
concept of appointment of standby counsel.  The concept of standby 
counsel is highly applicable and is a viable safeguard option for the 
court in permitting a defendant to proceed pro se.  This is especially true 
for a defendant whose competency to proceed pro se has been 
challenged, or whose competency to proceed pro se has been restored 
through medication or other methods. 
 
 121. See generally THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND 
INSTRUMENTS (2d ed. 2003). 
 122. Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954). 
 123. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
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In Wiggins, the Court recognized that: 
 A defendant’s right to self-representation plainly encompasses certain 
specific rights to have his voice heard.  The pro se defendant must be 
allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to 
make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to 
question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate 
points in the trial.124 
Recognizing that the right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity 
and autonomy of the accused, and to allow the presentation of what may, 
at least occasionally, be the accused defendant’s best possible defense, 
the Wiggins Court held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are 
not violated through the appointment of standby counsel.125  Standby 
counsel may be necessary to “relieve the judge of the need to explain 
and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant 
in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant’s 
achievement of his own clearly indicated goals.”126  The Wiggins Court 
further held that standby counsel’s participation in the basic procedures 
of the trial was permissible even if it somewhat undermined the pro se 
defendant’s appearance of control over the proceedings.127 
The Wiggins Court emphasized that the primary focus of the 
permissibility of standby counsel must be “on whether the defendant had 
a fair chance to present his case in his own way.”128  In the case of a 
defendant who has been restored to competency to proceed pro se, 
requiring mandatory appointment of standby counsel to assist the pro se 
defendant is a viable and workable safeguard to assure the dignity of the 
defendant and to assure that the decorum of the trial proceedings are 
observed.  Although the mandatory appointment of standby counsel for 
such defendants would incur additional costs for the court and the 
community, overall, it seems a small price to pay in order to uphold the 
constitutional rights of the defendant. 
Additionally, given that self-representation in criminal proceedings is 
a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment, the “tools” necessary 
to restore that right, i.e. medication and appointment of standby counsel, 
may fall within the purview of the Ake v. Oklahoma holding, especially 
if the defendant is an indigent defendant.129  In Ake, the Court held that 
 124. Id. at 174. 
 125. Id. at 184. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 174. 
 129. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).  The discussion in this Comment focuses exclusively 
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“meaningful access to justice” for indigent clients is important in 
ensuring the fairness of trial proceedings.130  To implement this 
principle, the Court in Ake and other past cases focused on identifying 
the “basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal.”131 
Although Ake specifically addressed psychiatric evaluations as a 
“basic tool,” the Ake analysis could possibly be extended to other 
contexts, including self-representation as a restorable right, in order to 
cover the costs of medication and standby counsel for indigent clients 
who elected to attempt to be restored to competency so that they could 
proceed pro se.  Ake identified three factors to be considered in 
determining whether something was a “basic tool of an adequate defense 
or appeal”: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the action of 
the state; (2) the governmental interest that will be affected if the 
safeguard is to be provided; and (3) the probable value of the additional 
or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, along with the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are 
not provided.132 
Applying the Ake analysis to whether medication and standby counsel 
are “basic tools” for the prospective restorable right pro se litigant 
model, one reaches the following conclusions: (1) The defendant’s 
liberty interest and interest in presenting his or her own defense are 
compelling interests.  (2) Providing medication to the defendant is 
unlikely to place an additional burden on the state.  If the defendant 
could be restored to competency for self-representation with medication, 
then most likely the defendant will also need to take medication to meet 
the CST standard, or at the very least will need medication to improve 
her daily quality of life.  Additionally, standby counsel is often assigned 
by the court when a competent defendant elects to proceed pro se, so the 
recommendation of mandatory standby counsel is unlikely to create an 
additional burden on the state.  (3) Following the rationale of the second 
factor, providing the defendant with medication and standby counsel is 
unlikely to place additional financial burdens on the state.  Additionally, 
as self-representation is a constitutional right, denying the defendant the 
right to present his or her own defense presents a great risk of erroneous 
constitutional deprivation to the defendant if the safeguards are not 
provided by the state.133 
on indigent clients.  Presumably, if a defendant is not indigent, the defendant would bear the burden of 
costs of medication and standby counsel as in other legal settings where the defendant is not indigent. 
 130. Id. at 77. 
 131. Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Appendix A, Examples of Trial Scenarios, for a more detailed evaluation of the estorable 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Lest the citizenry lose faith in the substance of the system and the 
procedures we use to administer it, we can ill afford to confront them with 
a government dominated by forms and mysterious rituals and then tell 
them they lose because they did not know how to play the game or should 
not have taken us at our word.134 
 
Self-representation in criminal proceedings is a defendant’s 
fundamental, constitutional right.  Instead of asking “[H]ow in the world 
can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?,”135 this 
Comment argued that the Court should adopt a workable standard that 
acknowledges competency to proceed pro se as a restorable right of the 
defendant.  This Comment demonstrated that a workable standard can be 
reached, in which defendants who elect to proceed pro se and who also 
have mental capacity concerns, are evaluated on a case-by-case basis by 
a third party mental health professional.  This process, along with the 
additional procedural safeguard of mandatory appointment of standby 
counsel, will ensure the dignity of the defendant and the decorum of the 
trial proceedings will be honored.  Additionally, this process will strike a 
workable balance between the fundamental liberty interests of 
defendants in presenting their own defense, and the government’s 
interest in assuring the fairness of the trial proceedings.  Anything less 














 134. Moore v. Price, 914 S.W.2d 318, 323 (Ark. 1996) (Mayfield, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Teegarden v. Dir., Ark. Emp’t Sec. Div. (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (Newbern, J., dissenting)). 
 135. Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387 (2008) (quoting the Brief of Ohio et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 24, Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008) (No. 07-208) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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Appendix A: Examples of Trial Scenarios 
 
Pro Se Defendant 
Without Mental 
Capacity Concerns 











the right to counsel. 
 
◦Court accepts the 
waiver. 
 











voluntarily waives the 
right to counsel. 
 
◦Court declines the 
waiver. 
 
◦Defendant is CST, 
but is found 
incompetent to 
proceed pro se. 
 
◦The trial judge 
rejects the 
defendant’s motion to 
proceed pro se and 




◦Defendant files motion 
to proceed pro se. 
 
◦Court orders CST 
evaluation. 
 
◦Defendant is found 
CST. 
 
◦However, court rejects 
defendant’s motion to 
proceed pro se, finding 
defendant has not 
knowingly and 
voluntarily waived the 
right to counsel because 




separate evaluation by 




◦MH professional finds 
defendant competent to 
proceed pro se. 
 
◦Defendant elects to 






evaluated after a period 
of time. 
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  ◦MH professional finds 
defendant competent to 
conduct his or her own 
defense. 
 
◦Trial judge accepts 
recommendation of 
MH professional and 
accepts the defendant’s 
waiver of counsel as 





of standby counsel. 
 
◦Defendant proceeds pro 
se and conducts his or 
her own defense with the 
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